We address the implications of the movement towards entertainment-centred, marketdriven media by comparing what is reported and what the public knows in four countries with different media systems. The different systems are public service (Denmark and Finland), a 'dual' model (United Kingdom) and the market model (United States). The comparison shows that public service television devotes more attention to public affairs and international news, and fosters greater knowledge in these areas, than the market model. Public service television also gives greater prominence to news, encourages higher levels of news consumption, and contributes to a smaller within-nation knowledge gap between the advantaged and disadvantaged. But wider processes in society take precedence over the organisation of the media in determining how much people know about public life.
In most parts of the world, the news media are becoming more market-oriented and entertainment-centred.* This is the consequence of three trends that have gathered pace since the 1980s: the multiplication of privately owned television channels, the weakening of programme requirements on commercial broadcasters ('de-regulation'), and a contraction in the audience size and influence of public broadcasters.
Our interest lies in addressing the consequences of the movement towards marketbased media for informed citizenship. The democratic process assumes that individual citizens have the capacity to hold elected officials accountable. In practice, political accountability requires a variety of institutional arrangements including free and frequent elections, the presence of strong political parties, and, of particular importance to this inquiry, a media system that delivers a sufficient supply of meaningful public affairs information to catch the eye of relatively inattentive citizens. Thus, we are interested in tracing the connections between the architecture of media systems, the delivery of news, and citizens' awareness of public affairs. In particular, we test the hypothesis that market-based systems, by delivering more soft than hard news, impede the exercise of informed citizenship.
Media Systems in Cross-National Perspective
There is considerable cross-national variation in the movement towards the American model. We take advantage of this variation by focusing on four economically advanced liberal democracies that represent three distinct media systems: an unreconstructed public service model in which the programming principles of public service still largely dominate (exemplified by Finland and Denmark), a dual system that combines increasingly deregulated commercial media with strong public service broadcasting organisations (Britain), and the exemplar market model of the United States.
This sample enables us to investigate whether variations in media organisation affect the quality of citizenship by giving rise to different kinds of reporting and patterns of public knowledge. 1 The American model is based on market forces with minimal interference by the state. America's media are overwhelmingly in private hands: its public service television (PBS) is under-resourced and accounts for less than 2 % of audience share (Iyengar and McGrady 2007) . Regulation of commercial broadcasting by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has become increasingly 'light touch,' meaning that American media are essentially entrepreneurial actors striving to satisfy consumer demand.
Yet, running counter to the increasing importance of market forces, American journalism continues to reflect a 'social responsibility' tradition. News coverage is expected to inform the public by providing objective reporting on current issues. In recent years, however, the rise of satellite and cable television and web-based journalism has weakened social responsibility norms. Increased competition resulted in smaller market shares for traditional news organizations; the inevitable decline in revenue led to significant budget cuts. One consequence was the closure of a large number of foreign news bureaus (Shanor, 2003) and a sharp reduction in foreign news coverage during the post-Cold War era (Schudson and Tifft, 2005) . News organizations increasingly turned to soft journalism, exemplified by the rise of local TV news programmes, centred on crime, calamities and accidents (Bennett, 2003) .
In sum, the American market model is more nuanced than it appears to be at first glance. Market pressures coexist with a commitment to social responsibility journalism.
However, intensified competition during the last twenty years have compelled news organizations to be more responsive to audience demand in a society which has a long history of disinterest in foreign affairs (Dimock and Popkin, 1997; Kull et al., 2004) and in which a large section of the population is disconnected from public life (Dionne 1991) .
In stark contrast to the US system, the traditional public service model --exemplified by Finland and Denmark --deliberately seeks to influence audience behaviour through a framework of public law and subsidy (Lund 2007) . The core assumption is that citizens must be adequately exposed to public affairs programming if they are to cast informed votes, hold government to account, and be properly empowered.
This argument is the basis for the generous subsidies provided public broadcasters, which helps to ensure that they secure large audiences. In Finland, the two main public The public interest argument is also invoked to justify the requirement that major commercial channels offer programming that informs the electorate. This requirement is enforced by independent regulatory agencies. The public service model thus embraces both the public and commercial broadcast sectors.
Britain represents a media system somewhere in-between the pure market (US) and public service (Denmark and Finland) models. On the one hand, Britain's flagship broadcasting organisation, the BBC, is the largest, best resourced public broadcaster in the world, and retains a large audience. The BBC's two principal channels, along with publicly owned Channel 4, accounted for 43% of viewing time in Britain in 2006 (BARB 2007 . On the other hand, the principal satellite broadcaster, BSkyB, was allowed to develop in a largely unregulated form, and the principal terrestrial commercial channel, ITV, was sold in a public auction during the 1990s, and its public obligations --though still significant --were lightened. This move towards the deregulation of commercial television had major consequences, some of which are only now becoming apparent.
Between 1988 and 1998, the foreign coverage of ITV's current affairs programmes was cut in half (Barnett and Seymour 1999) . By 2005, its factual international programming had dropped below that of any other terrestrial channel (Seymour and Barnett 2006: 6, Table 2 ). This had a knock-on effect on other broadcasters, most notably Channel 4 whose foreign coverage in 2005 was almost a third less than in 2000-1 (Seymour and Barnett 2006: 6, Table 2 ), but also on the BBC where there was a softening of news values (Winston 2002) .
By contrast with broadcasting, there is a greater affinity between the newspapers of the four countries since these are unregulated and overwhelmingly commercial enterprises. In the US, newspaper circulation has been declining steadily for several years contributing to a significant reduction in the number of daily papers; in fact, there are hardly any American cities with more than one daily paper.
Denmark has three directly competing national dailies, while in Finland the backbone of the press system consists of regional papers, though it has also competitive national papers. The rise of the Metro phenomenon of free distribution daily papers has fuelled additional competition in both countries.
The British press is somewhat distinctive in that its national newspapers greatly outsell the local press. This gives rise to intense competition between ten directly competing national dailies. Five of these serve relatively small affluent markets, rely heavily on advertising and are oriented towards public affairs, while the other five are directed towards a mass market and focus on entertainment. The latter group, which accounts for over three quarters of national newspaper circulation, has become increasingly frenetic in the pursuit of readers in response to a steady but now accelerating decline of newspaper sales (Curran and Seaton 2003) .
Overall, the differences between the media systems of the four countries are now less pronounced as they once were. But there remains, nonetheless, a significant contrast between the American television model which is geared primarily towards satisfying consumer demand, and the public service television systems in Finland, Denmark and, to a lesser degree, Britain which give greater priority to satisfying informed citizenship.
Research Design
In order to investigate the hypothesis that more market-oriented media systems foster less "serious" kinds of journalism that limits citizens' knowledge of public affairs, we combined a quantitative content analysis of broadcast and print sources in each country with a survey measuring public awareness of various events, issues and individuals in the news.
Content Analysis
Our media sources were the two principal television channels in each country (ABC and NBC News in the US, BBC1 and ITV in the UK, DR 1 and TV2 in Denmark, and YLE1 and MTV3 in Finland) and a representative group of daily newspapers. The US press sample consisted of an 'elite' daily (New York Times), a more popular-oriented national daily (USA Today), as well as a regional newspaper heavily dependent upon the wire services (Akron Beacon Journal). The Danish press was represented by the national broadsheet Jyllands-Posten, the national tabloid Ekstra Bladet, the national free sheet Nyhedsavisen, and the regional daily, JyskeVestkysten. The Finnish press sample was constituted by the national broadsheet Helsingin Sanomat, a big regional daily Aamulehti, the national tabloid Ilta-Sanomat and a national free sheet, Metro. Finally, the British press was represented by the circulation leaders of the upscale, mid-scale and downscale sectors of the national daily press (respectively, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail and Sun) 2 , and one local daily (Manchester Metro).
Each news source was monitored for a period of four (non-sequential) weeks in February-April, 2007 . The main evening news programme on each television channel was analysed. In the case of newspapers, scrutiny was limited to the main news sections of American newspapers which we compared to the main or general sections of their European counterparts.
The news sources were classified by trained student or research assistant coders in each country. The classification scheme consisted of a common set of content categories developed in advance by the researchers. Hard news was defined as reports about politics, public administration, the economy, science, technology and related topics, while soft news consisted of reports about celebrities, human interest, sport, and other entertainment-centred stories. However, in the particular case of crime, predetermining news coverage as either soft or hard proved to be misleading, prompting us to distinguish between different types of news stories. If a crime story was reported in a way that contextualised and linked the issue to the public good --for example, if the report referred to penal policies or to the general causes or consequences of crime --it was judged to be a hard news story assimilated to public affairs. If, however, the main focus of the report was the crime itself, with details concerning the perpetrators and victims, but with no reference to the larger context or implications for public policies, the news item was judged to be soft.
In addition to coding news reports as hard or soft, we classified news as reflecting either domestic or overseas events. Here we used a simple enumeration of nation states.
Each news report was classified according to the country or countries referenced in the report. We also coded the news for the presence of international or regional organizations (e.g. the United Nations or European Union).
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Survey Design
We designed a survey instrument (consisting of 28 multiple-choice questions) to reflect citizens' awareness of both hard and soft news as well as their familiarity with domestic versus international subject matter. 14 questions tapping awareness of international events (both hard and soft) were common to all four countries. This In the case of domestic news, hard news questions included recognition of public officials and current political controversies. Soft news questions focused primarily on celebrities, either entertainers or professional athletes. We supplemented the domestic questions with a set of country-specific questions related to the particular geo-political zone in which each country is situated. Americans, for example, were asked to identify
Hugo Chavez (President of Venezuela), the British and Finnish respondents were asked to identify Angela Merkel (Chancellor of Germany), while Danes were asked about the incoming British premier Gordon Brown. Once again, we took care to vary the difficulty level of the questions.
The survey was administered online, shortly after the period of media monitoring. 4 As Internet access has diffused, web-based surveys have become increasingly cost-effective competitors to conventional telephone surveys. Initially plagued by serious concerns over sampling bias (arising from the digital divide), online survey methodology has developed to the point where it is now possible to reach representative samples. Our survey design minimizes sampling bias through the use of sample matching, a methodology that features dual samples --one that is strictly probabilistic and based on an offline population, and a second that is non-probabilistic and based on a large panel of online respondents. The key is that each of the online respondents was selected to provide a mirror image of the corresponding respondent selected by conventional RDD methods. In essence, sample matching delivers a sample that is functionally equivalent to a conventional probability sample on the demographic attributes that have been matched (for a more technical discussion of sample matching, see Rivers, 2005) .
From each online panel, a sample of 1000 was surveyed. In the US, the sample was limited to registered voters; in Denmark, Finland and the UK, all citizens over the age of 18. In the US, UK and Finland, online sample respondents were matched to national samples on education, gender, and age (and, additionally, in the US, in relation to race). In Denmark, the sample was drawn from a representative panel, on the basis of controlled recruitment procedures ensuring a close correlation to the demographics of the total society. The results were later weighted on age and gender.
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The format and appearance of the online surveys were identical in each country.
Question order and the multiple-choice options (each question had five possible answers)
were randomized, and in order to minimize the possibility of respondents attempting to "cheat" by searching the web, each question remained on the screen for a maximum of 30 seconds before being replaced by the next question. In addition, the survey link had the effect of disabling the "back" button on the respondent's browser.
Results

Differences in News Content
Our content data shows that the market-driven television system of the United
States is overwhelmingly preoccupied with domestic news. American network news allocates only 20% of their programming time to reporting foreign news (47% of which, incidentally, is about Iraq). Whole areas of the world receive very little coverage and, indeed for much of the time, are virtually blacked out in American network news. By contrast, the European public service television channels represented in our study devote significantly more attention to overseas events. As a proportion of news programming time, foreign coverage on the main news channels in Britain and Finland is approaching double that in the United States (see table 1 ). However, part of British TV's joint lead in this area is due to its greater coverage of international soft news. If international soft news is excluded, the rank ordering of "internationalist" television coverage changes to Finland (27%) at the top, followed in descending order by Denmark (24%), Britain (23%) and the United States (15%). Ratings-conscious American networks also allocate significant time to soft news, both foreign and domestic, (37%), as does British television news (40%). This compares with much lower proportions in Finland and Denmark. Indeed, the Anglo-American daily quota of soft news is more than double that in Finland. The difference is partly due to the fact that both American and British television news allocates a significant amount of time (14% and 11% respectively) to entertainment, celebrities and gossip, unlike Danish and Finnish news (less than 5%).
In the case of newspapers, the pre-occupation with soft news is no longer an American prerogative. In fact, our sample of American newspapers was more oriented towards hard news than their counterparts in the European countries. This finding may be attributable, in part, to the inclusion of the New York Times, arguably the most "elite"
of American dailies and to the fact that the US press lacks a tabloid tradition.
Among the European countries studied, the Finnish press proved more hard news and international news oriented than the press in Denmark and Britain. As expected, the British press, with its significant tabloid tradition, is preoccupied with domestic stories (83%), soft news (60%), and devotes more space to sport (25%) than even the Danish press (13%). There are perhaps two surprises in these results. The first is that Finns and Danes have extensive knowledge of soft as well as hard news, something that is perhaps assisted by their popular press. The second is that American respondents seemed to know less in general about the world around them than Europeans (for which there is, as we shall see, an explanation).
Media Visibility and Public Knowledge
To further pursue the connection between news coverage and public knowledge we next examined whether greater media visibility of the topics and people we asked about, in a sample of newspapers in the four countries, one month and six months prior to our survey, was associated with higher levels of knowledge, and conversely whether reduced media prominence of topics/persons was associated with lower levels of knowledge. There were two limitations to this exercise. First, the availability of longitudinal data on news coverage limited the analysis to the print media, and did not include the more important medium of television. Second, there is an element of ambiguity about our understanding of visibility: a person who receives only limited press coverage in the six months leading up to the survey may yet have obtained extensive coverage before then, generating accumulated knowledge that is carried forward to the survey. Yet, despite these potentially distorting influences, the analysis suggests a clear statistical relationship between extended press visibility and public knowledge: visibility scores in the long period (in the 6 months preceding the survey) were good predictors of the percentage of correct answers given by our participants in the US, UK and Denmark, though not in Finland. Visibility in the short-term (during the preceding month) was a strong predictor in Denmark, a weak predictor in the UK, but could not predict knowledge in Finland and the US. (Guardian and Daily Telegraph) ; in Finland, the biggest national daily (Helsingin Sanomat), biggest regional daily (Aamulehti) and the biggest tabloid (IltaSanomat); and in Denmark, a national broadsheet (Jyllands-Posten), a national tabloid (Ekstra Bladet) and a regional daily (JyskeVestkysten). The sampled periods for the 6 month and 1 month periods were Jan 7 to June 7, 2007 and May 7 to June 7, 2007 respectively. The search criteria required the item to appear anywhere in the text. Names were searched using both first and family name; places were searched in association with the specific event (e.g. Sri Lanka + Tamil Tigers; Sudan + Darfur).
This analysis thus corroborates our assertion that what the media report --or fail to report --affects what is known. The sustained lack of attention given to international news on American television and the lack of knowledge of international public affairs in America 7 is no coincidence.
Cross-National Differences in Media Exposure
To this point, we have examined the relationship between the supply of news and the level of public knowledge. But knowledge is obviously also contingent on individuals' motivation to know --their interest in current events and attentiveness to the news media. We asked survey respondents to indicate the frequency with which they used various media sources. The results showed substantial cross-national differences:
Americans consume relatively little news from conventional media by comparison with populations elsewhere. Just 39% of American respondents report that they look at national TV news more than four days a week. This contrasts with 78% in Denmark, 76%
in Finland and 73% in Britain.
One reason for this contrast is that significant numbers of citizens in the United
States --a vast country with different time zones and a politically devolved form of government --are oriented towards local rather than national news. A higher proportion in the United States (51%) say that they watch regularly local television news than in Denmark (43%) and Finland (29%), though not in Britain (56%). But low consumption of national television news in the US is also symptomatic of the traditionally light American news diet. Only 37% of American respondents say that they read newspapers more than 4 days a week in the US, against 71% in Finland, 58% in Denmark and 44% in the UK. Just 39% of Americans listen to radio news more than 4 days a week, compared to significantly higher levels elsewhere (51% Finland; 56% UK; and 65% in Denmark).
In short, one reason why Americans know less about the world around them than 
Within-Nation Knowledge Gaps
Another factor contributing significantly to American underperformance is that the knowledge gap between social groups is greater in America than in the three other European countries we studied. Disadvantaged groups in the United States perform especially poorly in our knowledge tests, lowering the national average. But disadvantaged groups in Finland, Denmark and Britain know just as much as their more privileged counterparts, thus raising the national averages in these countries.
The contrast is especially notable in relation to education. We divided the populations of the four countries into three comparable educational groups --those with limited education, moderate education (including significant post-school qualifications or some university education), and the highly educated (graduates and postgraduates). Those with limited education in the United States score very much lower in relation to hard news questions than those with higher education. The difference between these groups is a massive 40 percentage points. By contrast, the difference between the same two groups amounts to 14 percentage points in Britain, 13 percentage points in Finland and in effect no different from zero in Denmark (see Table 5 ).
A similar pattern recurs in relation to income (though income data was not collected in Denmark). In the United States, an average of only 29% of the low income group could give correct answers to hard news questions, compared with 61% of the high income group --a difference of 32 percentage points. The comparable difference is less than half this in Britain, and is actually inverted in Finland.
There is also a significant hard news knowledge gap between the ethnic majority and ethnic minorities in the United States of 15 percentage points. But in Britain, there is none. Data was not analysed for ethnic minorities in Denmark and Finland where they are a very small proportion of the population.
These findings fit a general pattern of higher variance in the distribution of knowledge in the United States compared with elsewhere. The difference, for example, in the hard news scores of men and women, and of young and old, is more pronounced in the United States than in the three European countries. Thus, 24% more correct answers to hard news questions were given by men compared with women in the US, compared with a 16% difference in the UK, and 12% in Finland. In Denmark the gender gap was reversed, with 9% more correct answers being given by women than by men. Thus, there appears to be a significantly higher minimum information threshold in the three European countries compared with the United States. 
Media Systems and Social Inclusion
National television in European countries is more successful in reaching disadvantaged groups (defined here in terms of income, education and ethnicity), partly as a consequence of its public service tradition. Public broadcasters, financed by a license fee or public grant, are under enormous pressure to connect to all sections of society in order to justify their continued public funding. Any evidence that they are losing their appeal to a section of the audience usually results in urgent internal inquests, and demands for remedial action. 8 By contrast, commercial media tend to be exposed to pressure to prioritise high spending audiences in order to maximise advertising revenue.
This can result in low income groups receiving less attention and, even in exceptional cases, being deliberately shunned Seaton 2003: Turow 1997; Baker 1994 ).
The central objectives of public service and commercial media are also different.
The primary goal of commercial media is to make money, while that of public service organisations is to 'serve society' in ways that are defined in law and regulation. One of their principal public obligations is to inform the public, which influences when news programs are transmitted.
The three American television networks transmit their main news programmes in the early and late evening. They reserve the hours between 7 pm and 11 pm for entertainment in order to maximise ratings and revenue. By contrast, the top three television channels in Finland transmit their main news programmes at different times throughout the evening: at 6 pm, 7 pm, 8.30 pm and 10 pm (and, on one of these principal channels, a daily current affairs programme at 9.30 pm). In Denmark, the two leading television channels transmit their main news programmes at 6pm, 7pm and 10pm, spliced by a current affairs programme on one of these channels at 9.30 PM. In both countries, the top television channels (including Finland's commercial MTV3 channel) offer a steady drip-feed of public information during primetime in contrast to the intensive entertainment diet of America's market-driven television. British television balances uncertainly between these two models. In 1999, the principal commercial television channel (ITV) adopted the American scheduling strategy of an early and late evening news slot, something made possible by its increased deregulation. This exerted ratings pressure on the BBC 1, which then moved its 9 pm news programme to 10 pm. Public pressure then forced ITV, in 2004, to bring forward its main news programme to the earlier time of 10.30 pm. The main news inputs from Britain's top three channels are now 6 pm, 6.30 pm, 7 pm, 10 pm and 10.30 pm. As a consequence of their social inclusion and information commitments, public service broadcasters in Finland, Denmark and even Britain have been relatively successful in getting disadvantaged groups to join in the national ritual of watching the evening news. Much higher proportions of the less educated and those with low incomes watch television news on a regular basis there than in the United States (see table 6 ). This is not just a function of the higher levels of national TV news consumption in these three countries. The difference between the proportion of those with limited education and the national average in regular exposure to television news is smaller in the United Kingdom and Finland than in the US; and the same is true for low income groups in the United Kingdom and Denmark. Similarly, ethnic minorities' exposure to national TV news is below the national average in the US, but the same as the national average in the UK.
The greater degree of economic inequality in the US, compared with Europe, is probably the main cause of the large knowledge disparity in the US. But one reason why the low income and low education groups in the US are less informed about hard news is that they are much less inclined to watch national television news than their counterparts in the three European countries. Moreover, because American television news is limited to a single time slot, there are fewer opportunities to reach the inattentive.
Hierarchy of Influence
But although cross-national differences in the organization of media, and how and when news is reported, are significant influences on levels of public knowledge, they are less important than deep-seated societal factors. This is highlighted by the regression model that we constructed for predicting knowledge of hard news topics in the four countries (see Table 7 ). The model accounts for a good amount of variance, approaching half in the pooled dataset. It shows that gender and education are strong predictors of knowledge, more so than media exposure. But what is very much more important (and whose mediation also diminishes these other factors as autonomous influences) is interest in politics. Respondents who say that they want to be up-date with what happens in government, are interested in politics, and talk about politics are greatly more knowledgeable than those who express lack of interest. Indeed, being interested is the single most important correlate of hard news knowledge in all four countries. 
Conclusion
As a determinant of knowledge about public life, how the media are organised is less important than the widespread cultural processes in a society that stimulate interest in public affairs. But this does not mean that the architecture of media systems is unimportant. Our evidence suggests that the public service model of broadcasting gives greater attention to public affairs and international news, and thereby fosters greater knowledge in these areas, than the market model. The public service model makes television news more accessible on leading channels and fosters higher levels of TV news consumption. It also tends to minimize the knowledge gap between the advantaged and disadvantaged and therefore contributes to a more egalitarian pattern of citizenship.
Indeed, we suspect that a critical difference between the public service and market models is the greater ability of the former to engage an "inadvertent" audience: people who might be generally disinclined to follow the course of public affairs, but who cannot help encountering news while awaiting delivery of their favourite entertainment programs. The fact that public service television intersperses news with entertainment increases the size of the inadvertent audience.
But perhaps the most significant result to emerge from this study is the low level of attention that the market-driven television system of the United States gives to the world outside America, and to a lesser extent, to hard news generally. This lack of attention contributes to the relatively high level of public ignorance in America about the wider world and about public life in general. Yet, the entertainment-centred model of American television is being adopted all around the world. This trend seems set to foster an impoverished public life characterised by declining exposure to serious journalism and by reduced levels of public knowledge.
In closing, we would note that the impact of media system attributes (e.g. the scope of television deregulation) on public knowledge will inevitably vary across nations because of existing differences in civic education and the acquisition of cultural norms known to increase knowledge (i.e. interest in politics and the sense of civic duty).
Similarly, we expect deregulation to have more powerful consequences for nations characterized by relatively higher levels of economic inequality. Nonetheless, even after taking these structural differences into account, media provision of public information does matter, and continued deregulation of the broadcast media is likely, on balance, to lead to lower levels of civic knowledge. samples and face-to face interviews indicate trivial differences between the telephone and online modes, but substantial divergences from the face-to-face mode (Hill et al., 2007; Malhotra and Krosnick, 2006) . In general, the online samples appear biased in the direction of politically engaged and attentive voters. For instance, in comparison with National Election Study respondents (interviewed face-to-face), PMX online respondents were more likely by eight percentage points to correctly identify the Vice-President of the US. This would suggest that our online samples are somewhat better informed about public affairs, in all countries, than samples based on personal or telephone interviews.
However, the issue of sampling bias must be considered in relation to costs. In the US, national samples based on personal interviews cost $1000 per respondent, while matched online samples cost approximately $20 per respondent, making possible larger samples and increasing the precision of the sample estimates. And as several analysts have noted (e.g. Bartels, 1985) , a biased but precise estimator may in fact be preferable to one that is unbiased but imprecise.
In Denmark, the online survey reported in this study was duplicated using a comparable telephone-based sample. There were minor differences between the results, confirming the trend towards higher knowledge scores online noted above. But none of these differences detract from the conclusions of this essay. Detailed insights to be derived from comparing the two survey modes will be the subject of a separate methodological essay.
6. Newspapers are a more important source of news in Finland than they are in the three other countries. Daily circulation per 1000 adults in 2005 was 518 in Finland, compared with 250 in US, 294 in Denmark and 348 in the UK (Anon 2006 ).
7. See also Dimock and Popkin (1997) , a clever essay which provided a key stimulus for this study.
8. For example, the BBC is urgently seeking, in 2007, to connect to the news concerns of the young and ethnic minorities, following a report concluding that the corporation's television news is losing its appeal to these groups.
